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6.1 Introduction
The 1990s saw vast structural transformations in Argentina. After half
ac e ntury of low growth, high and volatile inﬂation, and stagnating living
standards, Argentina introduced many reforms that yielded remarkably
strong growth while inﬂation dwindled. The change of “economic para-
digm” led to a number of behavioral changes that were reﬂected in other
areas. But perhaps the most striking change took place in the labor mar-
ket. There, where reforms were moderate, the most noticeable diﬀerence
appeared. High open unemployment was the outcome. Could it be that the
lack of ambitious reforms in labor market practices was behind this unfor-
tunate outcome?
Historically, Argentina’s labor market had been characterized by the rela-
tive scarcity of unskilled labor. This was reﬂected in moderate open urban
unemployment and in the need to resort, periodically, to foreign labor to
cover labor shortages. Wages and other hiring conditions were in keeping
with the greater bargaining power that stemmed from excess labor demand.
In particular, the dominant economic model limited the need for the econ-
omy to reallocate resources. The result was a depressed rate of job creation
and, especially, destruction. This made a number of union- and government-
sponsored demands compatible with the opportunities faced by ﬁrms. How-
ever, low growth and high and accelerating inﬂation ended up pushing the
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1990s took place mainly in monetary aﬀairs and in goods and service mar-
ket behavior, not labor markets. This asymmetry in changes has been cited
by many as an underlying factor in the appearance of high unemployment.
Argentina evidenced remarkably stable growth in employment during
the 1980s (at 1.1 percent annual rate, barely enough to accommodate pop-
ulation growth) while gross domestic product (GDP) was shrinking (–0.9
percent annually). Conversely, during much of the 1990s GDP growth was
not only strong but also quite sustained (on average, 5.2 percent per year
during 1990–1998). The behavior of employment, once again, did not
match that of GDP (0.9 percent per year; see table 6.1).
Unemployment in the 1990s reached record levels (18.6 percent in 1995)
and scored in the double digits after 1994. Movements in demand or supply
could explain changes in the rate of unemployment. If labor market regu-
lations were to seriously hinder job creation, they would have to operate on
the demand side.
Labor demand dynamics could arise from a number of factors. In par-
ticular, given our interest in the potential eﬀect of regulations, it appears
crucial to evaluate how movements in labor costs could inﬂuence job cre-
ation dynamics. The question of whether labor market regulations reduce
ﬂexibility is a matter of substantial controversy. Critics claim that strong
job rights prevent employers from adjusting to economic ﬂuctuations (Lu-
cas and Fallon 1991; Oi 1962). It is also alleged that, by inhibiting layoﬀs
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Table 6.1 Macroeconomics Indicators: 1974–1998
GDP per Jobs per Inﬂation Labor
Capita Capita GDP/Jobs Unemploymenta Rateb Forcec
(1) (2) (3)   (1)/(2) (4) (5) (6)
1974 91.9 100.9 91.1 3.3 24.2 102.9
1980 100.0 100.0 100.0 2.6 100.8 100.0
1985 83.9 95.6 87.8 6.1 672.2 99.2
1988 86.7 98.2 88.3 6.3 343.0 102.8
1989 79.4 97.2 81.7 7.6 3,079.5 103.5
1990 77.0 96.3 80.0 7.5 2,314.0 102.3
1991 84.1 98.4 85.5 6.5 171.7 103.5
1992 90.9 99.2 91.6 7.0 24.9 105.8
1993 95.0 98.5 96.5 9.6 10.6 109.9
1994 101.3 96.3 105.2 11.5 4.2 109.4
1995 96.1 91.9 104.6 17.5 3.4 112.1
1997 106.6 95.1 112.1 14.9 0.5 114.4
1998 109.8 97.6 112.5 12.8 0.9 115.1
Source: IERAL database.
Note: Index 1980   100.
aGran Buenos Aires (GBA).
bAnnual rate.
cGBA. Index 1980   100.during downturns, strong job rights reduce the employer’s willingness to
hire people during recoveries, thus contributing to unemployment. Sup-
porters of strong workers’ rights argue that job security provisions have no
observable eﬀects.
In Argentina, workers have historically enjoyed strong job rights (in-
cluding a right to advanced layoﬀnotice and to severance payments). Dur-
ing the 1990s, and following the rapid growth in unemployment, these reg-
ulations came under attack. Many argued that the cost equivalent of these
provisions had become an increasing nuisance. Figure 6.1 shows an ap-
proximation to the cost burden implied by job security provisions split into
its three main components: (1) average tenure of formal sector employees;
(2) layoﬀs over labor force; and (3) average wages in the formal sector.1The
three panels suggest signiﬁcant changes in all three components of ﬁrms’
expected costs. As the economy went deeper into restructuring and reform
(1991–1997), regulations became increasingly binding. As mean real wage
earnings grew, the probability that a worker would be laid oﬀ (approxi-
mated by the fraction of layoﬀs) tripled, while average tenure was cut by 20
percent.2
It is possible that increases in regulatory costs had a substantive impact
on labor demand. The puzzling increase in output per worker, presented
in table 6.1, could be the result of optimizing behavior by ﬁrms that at-
tempted to increase output without new hires and looked to save on the
(anticipated) growing costs of severance. Output per worker may have
grown in part from an increased use of overtime workers.
In this paper we provide some evidence on these issues. We exploit, for
the ﬁrst time, a panel data set that covers over 1,300 manufacturing ﬁrms
for the period 1990–1996. The panel provides information on employment
and hours worked, as well as overtime, wages, and physical production.
The data, however, are constrained to a limited sector (manufacturing)
and, most important, to a relatively short period of time. Unfortunately,
most sizable changes in labor market regulations occurred by the end of
1995, only a year before the panel was discontinued, making it harder to
identify the eﬀects on labor demand. We nevertheless exploit the hours
worked/jobs relation to shed some light on labor market dynamics.
We structure the rest of the paper by presenting, in section 6.2, some se-
lected institutional features of Argentina’s labor market that focus on job
security regulations and payroll taxes. Section 6.3 considers two important
descriptive issues: Who beneﬁts from regulations, and how much do they
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1. The fourth component is the legal provision that mandates the number of salaries per
years of tenure. Over the two decades, legislative changes focused only on changing the max-
imum number of salaries that might be paid. Since these changes were minor and are hard to
identify for the aggregate labor force, the pattern observed in ﬁgure 6.1 should appropriately
proxy for severance payments cost.
2. It is very diﬃcult to construct an aggregate proxy for the average severance costs because
of the nonlinearity of the severance compensation scheme.354 Guillermo Mondino and Silvia Montoya
Fig. 6.1 Expected severance payment—Gran Buenos Aires, 1974–1997
Source: IERAL database.
cost? The evidence is based on Permanent Household Survey (PHS) mi-
crodata and identiﬁes the eﬀects on individuals’ labor market outcomes
stemming from varying regulations. We turn to ﬁrm-level dynamic labor
demand estimation in section 6.4. We document the dynamic responsive-
ness of employment and hours to changes in output and labor costs at the
ﬁrm level. Section 6.5 concludes.
6.2 Institutional Background
Argentina’s labor market, like those of many developing nations, diﬀers
in important ways from those operating in industrial countries. Perhapsthe most symptomatic diﬀerences are the relative importance of self-
employment and informal work practices (deﬁned as those not covered by
regulations or contributing to social security). These observations have of-
ten been taken as evidence of asphyxiating regulations and steep taxation.
Furthermore, and as a natural extension, it is argued that wage formation
depends critically on labor market institutions and government regula-
tions such as trade unions, minimum wage laws, job security provisions,
and so forth.
There are three layers of binding legal regulations that govern worker-
ﬁrm relations. They are, in terms of decreasing importance,3 (1) the Work-
ers’ Statute (Ley de Contrato de Trabajo—20.744) and other general legis-
lation such as superior rank laws, which establish many labor relations
rules and the framework for collective bargaining; (2) centralized collective
bargaining at the sector level, which operates as a second tier; and (3) ﬁrm-
level contracts, which, if they exist, can only build upon the previous two.4
Labor regulations also introduce other distortions. Workers’ statutes in-
troduce speciﬁc job security provisions in the form of expensive ﬁring
costs. The statute also restricts hiring by limiting tryout periods. Sick leave,
vacations, and pregnancy provisions are also quite generously provided at
the most general level. A thirteenth wage is also mandatory and must be
paid in halves at midyear and year-end. Similarly, contributions to union-
sponsored health programs are required (regardless of whether the services
are being used).5
6.2.1 Employment Legislation
Nonwage labor costs include a number of items other than the usual so-
cial security contributions. A number of these costs that arise from diﬀer-
ent regulations have been the subject of changes over the last few years. A
basic characterization of labor regulations and taxes appears in the fol-
lowing sections.
Legal Framework for Individual Contracts
The most important provisions are types of contracts; job security pro-
visions; and working hours, holidays, and sick leave.
Of the types of contracts, the most prevalent is the indeterminate dura-
tion type, or lifetime contract, which enjoys the highest degree of protec-
tion. Dismissal, if it occurs, is always presumed to be unfair. Some types of
temporary contracts were allowed and used previous to 1995, but they were
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3. That is, if contracts are signed taking into consideration agreements at level (3) they can-
not be in disagreement with terms established at level (2), much less with those at level (1). In
other words, level (1) sets a minimum standard.
4. Some areas are outside the scope of the general laws. In those cases the collective agree-
ment is set up as a statute with rank of law. Examples are the rural sector worker statute, the
journalist statute, and others.
5. An additional source of cost is the contribution of active workers to the pensioners’
health program (PAMI).considered exceptional, while permanent arrangements were the rule. In
December 1995 some reforms were introduced that added new types of
ﬁxed-term contracts. Their main features were lower severance payments,
an extended tryout period with reduced social security contributions, and
other beneﬁts to make them more attractive for employers. This regulatory
change added a new dimension to an already complex labor market. Start-
ing in 1999 those contracts were made illegal.6
Job security provisions include mandatory written advance notice be-
fore a ﬁring and severance payments. Costs increase with tenure (see ﬁgure
6A.1).
There are limited opportunities for micro-level decisions concerning the
distribution of hours worked, overtime, night work, and vacation periods.
There is generous maternity and sick leave.7
Collective Labor Laws
The basic laws are union (called professional associations) laws; sector
wage bargaining has been the predominant mode of bargaining in Argen-
tina, framed as collective agreements. As previously mentioned, collective
agreements often set ﬂoors, which can only be built upon, at lower levels
of negotiations.
The interaction of the two laws deﬁnes a sticky situation (see ﬁgure 6.2).
On the one hand, collective agreements delimit the basic features of con-
tracts. On the other hand, union law identiﬁes those participants in any col-
lective bargain and deﬁnes conditions under which anyone else other than
the sectoral/regional level (third grade) association could sign a collective
agreement.8 Together they have important implications for the functioning
of markets and industrial relations. For instance, regional shocks cannot be
easily accommodated since they cut across many sectors but, not being
widespread enough, will not trigger renegotiations at sector-speciﬁc levels.
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6. The changes introduced in 1995 were introduced “at the margin” and were aimed at solv-
ing the increasingly complicated employment outlook as well as adding some ﬂexibility to a
very sclerotic market. In particular, the choice was to enhance the ﬂexibility of hirings for new
cohorts of workers that entered the market from 1995 onward. The number of ﬁxed-term con-
tracts rose from less than 1 percent of formal wage earners in 1995 to almost 5 percent by the
end of 1998. The steep increase in short-term employment contrasted with moderate growth
in total dependent employment. The share of short-run employment (ﬁxed-term plus trial pe-
riod contracts) reached about 10 percent of total formal employment.
7. Sometimes the restrictions arise from the law; others arise from the collective agreements.
The problem is that many of these agreements date from a period of extensive government
presence in the economy. It is one thing for sectorial-level unions to negotiate with private
ﬁrms subject to strict budget constraints and quite another to do it with a government-owned
corporation with soft budget constraints. The banking-sector contract is an example of this
problem, among many others.
8. The Ley de Asociaciones Profesionalesdeﬁnes the structure of the union sector. The third
grade association of national range, the most forceful ones, are the only ones who can sign a
collective agreement and who, eventually, can give authorization for decentralized negotia-
tions.That is, in spite of individual ﬁrms’ and workers’ having strong incen-
tives to revise their contracts, regulations make such revisions illegal. Busi-
ness participants report that this has, eﬀectively, been one of the greatest
restrictions to renegotiations of contracts, aﬀecting mostly smaller and re-
mote ﬁrms and workers with the least say in centralized negotiations.
The problem is compounded because of the automatic renewal clause,
called ultractividad. This clause automatically extends the terms of an ear-
lier collective agreement if the parties do not reach a new one, which occurs
if any one party is in disagreement.
Social Security
Social security consists of pension law, family allowances, workers’ com-
pensation laws, health care funds (“obras sociales”), unemployment insur-
ance, and the pensioners’ health care scheme (PAMI).9
Table 6.2 shows the current picture of labor costs in Argentina for a life-
time contract.10
In the 1990s reforms concentrated on two basic aspects: social security
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Fig. 6.2 Labor law mechanism
Source: IERAL database.
9. Workers’ compensation was reformed in July 1996, when a new system was introduced
with costs that averaged 2.5 percent of gross wages. The previous scheme was highly unfair
and arbitrarily opened up opportunities for expensive litigation and corruption. The re-
formed system introduced mandatory insurance, the organization of a market, and speciﬁc
limits on the magnitude of compensations. It is widely regarded as a massive improvement
over the previous legislation.
10. Since 1995 employers’ contributions have been subject to deductions according to re-
gion and branch of activity of the ﬁrm.and its ﬁnancing, and the introduction of ﬁxed-term contracts. General
dissatisfaction with the costs of the social security scheme triggered a sig-
niﬁcant reform that became operational in 1994. Workers and ﬁrms regard
social security contributions as a tax, not deferred compensation. As such,
many undertake elusive actions that end up generating inequalities and in-
eﬃciencies, favoring a precarious system of labor relationships.11
The pension reform was aimed at all workers in the market place. It
spurred a transfer of individuals from the pay-as-you-go system onto a
newly created fully funded one. The two systems would coexist. Most work-
ers adopted the new system.12
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Table 6.2 Nonwage Labor Cost Structure (percentage over gross wage)
Normal Share Over
Contributions Contract Total Cost






Family allowancesb 7.5 13.2
Unemployment fundb 1.5 2.6
Health care scheme 9 15.8
Employee 3 5.3
Employer 5 8.8
Workers’ compb 2.5 4.4
Social security overall cost 52.5 92.0
Severance paymenta 5 8.8
Advance noticea 0.5 0.9
Employee’s cost 17 29.8
Employer’s cost 40 70.2




11. Figure 6A.2 shows the evolution of social security ﬁnancing from 1960, the starting pe-
riod of a more structural social security system. Until 1990 the diﬀerent programs functioned
with great diﬃculty because of the existence of diﬀerent institutions performing the same role.
12. Over 60 percent of all covered workers and over 90 percent of new hires belong to the
fully funded scheme. A signiﬁcant diﬃculty with the original design was ﬁnding ﬁnancing for
the transitional phase. Current retirees must be supported via contributions from those who
remain in the pay-as-you-go system and through taxes on those in the fully funded one. The
high rate of taxation necessary to balance the system became a serious policy issue as it
clashed with employment needs. For this reason, in 1994 a system of graduated labor tax re-
ductions was put into place. The reductions were moderated in 1995, because of high ﬁscal
needs, and brought back more aggressively in 1996.6.2.2 Informality
A traditional view regards informality as the disadvantaged workers in
a dual labor market who are segmented by rules or legal rigidities that in-
troduce high costs in the formal sector.13 Only wage earners declare their
social security standing and whether they are protected by labor legisla-
tion. As it turns out, the correlation between regulatory coverage and so-
cial security is close to one. All wage earners registered in the social secu-
rity system enjoy that protection. The converse is not necessarily true. We
deﬁne as informal a wage earner who declares himself or herself as not reg-
istered in the social security system.
Figure 6.3 shows the breakdown of employment and its evolution for
the largest urban center in Argentina: the Greater Buenos Aires area. The
graph illustrates a segmentation of the labor market in three basic compo-
nents:14self-employment, formal wage earners, and informal wage earners.
Previous work shows that self-employment constitutes a desirable alterna-
tive in itself to formal employment.15 PHS data illustrate that the share of
Labor Market Regulations on Employment Decisions by Firms: Argentina 359
13. An interesting feature of this segment is that it is hard to establish the most important
reason why ﬁrms opt to operate there. While regulations may be suﬀocating, the opportuni-
ties for tax evasion are also important. Indeed, if the ﬁrm holds informal labor contracts, it
cannot contribute to social security, but then it must have a source of unreported revenue to
pay those wages. This revenue could stem from tax evasion in the goods market. The decision
to operate informally may be associated with a complex set of opportunities.
14. The idea of segmentation is used loosely here. We do not mean two completely separate
markets but rather two segments of a market that present diﬀerent prices and somewhat
diﬀerent properties. Because of the nature of many choices in the labor markets (i.e., large
ﬁxed costs and/or irreversibility of some decisions), often the pattern of response is diﬀerent
according to whether we are considering wage earners or self-employed people. What we im-
ply by segmentation in such a case is that the rate of transformation between them is limited.
15. The same evidence is available for Mexico. See Maloney (1997, 1998) for details.
Fig. 6.3 Labor force composition—Gran Buenos Aires, 1974–1997
Source: IERAL database.self-employed workers remains relatively constant. On the other hand,
there is a signiﬁcant upward trend over the last two decades in the share of
informal wage earners.
6.3 The Eﬀects of Labor Market Regulations: 
Evidence from Household Microdata
Job security provisions are, in general, regulatory measures enacted as
social protection to mitigate the risk of unemployment among workers by
forcing ﬁrms to provide subsidies during downturns. The main mechanism
is large severance payments that prevent workers from being laid oﬀ dur-
ing downturns. In Argentina it also implies lengthy and expensive proce-
dures that inhibit layoﬀs by driving up ﬁring costs. It is sometimes argued
that the macroeconomic adjustment is further shifted toward the informal
sector. Hence, many perceive job security provisions as inequitable for un-
protected workers (Riveros and Paredes 1990; Rosenweig 1988).16
Those who support regulations in the job market claim that they are
commendable to the extent that their objective is the protection of workers
against unsafe work practices and unjustiﬁed dismissals. They also state
that regulations protect the weakest members of society, that they help to
redistribute income, and that they stabilize earnings for those people sub-
ject to greater risks.
Job security is one form of nonwage compensation. Besides inducing
greater immobility, job security increases labor costs to the ﬁrm. The in-
crease in labor costs depends on how workers value job security and,
speciﬁcally, whether it is a substitute for or a complement to wage com-
pensation.
Who beneﬁts from these types of regulations? Do they cost something,
at least in terms of forgone earnings? Could we predict which individuals
are the most likely to proﬁt from deregulation? These questions have no
simple answer but deserve serious consideration before any action is taken
to alter the current regulatory standing.
6.3.1 Who “Beneﬁts” from Regulations?
The probability of holding a job that is covered by regulations varies
across individuals. We analyze a pooled sample of wage earners from the
Buenos Aires metropolitan area for the 1975–1997 period. We divide the
sample between males and females. The model we estimate is a simple pro-
bit equation in which the dependent variable is a dummy distinguishing
workers that can claim severance payments in case of dismissal (see table
6A.1 for description of the variables). The correlates included follow.
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16. In studies that deal with segmented labor markets, an increase in job security leads to
greater labor spillover to informal activities, causing a decline in labor earnings and a higher
rate of quasi-voluntary unemployment.Educational level:Higher educational level implies higher productivity and
should increase the probability of being in the formal sector. Lower-
educational-level workers could be pushed to the informal sector be-
cause their low productivity may not be enough to counter the added
costs of minimum wage laws and other mandatory costs.
Experience:As with any Mincer equation, experience increases general hu-
man capital and, hence, productivity.
Tenure on the job: Longer tenure must reﬂect a better match and greater
job-speciﬁc human capital. If a ﬁrm could choose the type of jobs for
which it oﬀered job security, it would provide it to workers that have ac-
cumulated a high level of ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital. Workers would in
turn pay back in the form of higher productivity.
Branch of activity:This consists of a purely empirical set of correlates to ac-
count for sector-speciﬁc diﬀerences in the enforcement capabilities of
control agencies, the degree of monopsony power, unionization, and in-
stability of activities.
The size of the company: These characteristics are similar to those of the
previous correlate.
Regulatory status of another family member: It is quite possible that work-
ers become increasingly prone to accept job oﬀers without regulatory
coverage when a household has diversiﬁed risks—in particular, when
the spouse or another family member enjoys regulatory coverage. More-
over, the regulatory framework favors precarious insertion for the so-
called secondary workers. There is no incentive to register since health
and other beneﬁts will not recognize more than one contribution per
household.
Marital status: This variable is introduced in the female regression, bear-
ing in mind the gender-biased features of the legislation. We should an-
ticipate a negative sign.
Children under 6: These characteristics are similar to those of the previous
correlate.
Table 6.3 reports the results for females and males of the derivatives of a
probit model where the dependent variable is the possibility of claiming
severance payment compensation if the worker is laid oﬀ.17
The results indicate that regulations are increasingly prevalent the
higher the human capital of the individual. The chances that regulations
are present grow with the educational level. Males show, however, that for
those with a college education the probability decreases a bit. Those with
a university-level education select themselves out of wage-earning jobs and
into self-employment to avoid the impact of high taxation.18
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17. Raw results of probit regressions are reported in table 6A.2.
18. Women, because of their specialization (teaching, nursing, medicine), have a higher
probability of being covered than their male counterparts. The reason is that their employer
is the government.As with most Mincer equations, experience shows the normal concavity.
Here it increases the probability of having regulatory coverage. Tenure also
shows a positive coeﬃcient that is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
Family status is also important. Mothers with young children tend to be
less protected. Legislation intends to provide coverage for women (mater-
nity leave, special leaves), yet it ends up with a strong market outcome bi-
ased against them.
We also ﬁnd that if another family member happens to enjoy the cover-
age of regulations, it is more likely that the worker in question has a regu-
lated match. A plausible explanation is that couples are formed with indi-
viduals of equivalent condition.
Part-time activities are less protected. The regulatory framework does
not favor registration for part-time contracts. Moreover, there are no in-
centives for it to do so. Contributions to social security (the biggest com-
ponent of nonwage labor cost) were calculated, up until late 1996, as if the
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Table 6.3 Probit Estimation: Jobs with Severance Payment Rights (Gran Buenos Aires
1975–1997, wage earners subsample)
Women Men
Variable dF/dx ZX -bar dF/dx ZX -bar
Primary 0.0466 2.14 0.3911 –0.008 –0.07 0.5542
High school 0.2134 9.24 0.3572 0.0979 7.73 0.2571
College 0.2565 10.59 0.1720 0.0773 4.43 0.0849
Experience 0.0207 11.82 20.1224 0.0164 13.48 22.3182
Experience∗∗2– 0.0003 –8.75 577.0800 –0.003 –11.85 670.0120
Tenure 0.0016 3.58 6.8277 0.0025 7.07 7.9136
Construction/House 
help –0.4622 –20.98 0.1645 –0.2952 –18.93 0.0679
Manufacturing 0.2169 2.15 0.0035 0.1213 3.44 0.0134
Retail 0.0679 4.16 0.1399 –0.0436 –4.32 0.1607
Transport 0.1367 4.28 0.0277 –0.0680 –5.89 0.1232
Finance 0.1299 6.86 0.1017 0.0156 1.12 0.0897
Private and Social 
Services 0.1732 11.25 0.5452 –0.0057 –0.58 0.2184
Size  25 0.1755 13.54 0.2025 0.1251 16.59 0.2362
Size  100 0.3035 21.91 0.1781 0.2284 28.37 0.1734
Largest 0.3052 21.26 0.1827 0.2730 33.9 0.2332
Family_reg 0.4455 39.67 0.3276 0.3280 41.86 0.2672
Ptime –0.2022 –16.55 0.3532 –0.1992 –17.31 0.1160
Household Head 0.0082 0.49 0.1787 0.1422 14.8 0.6723
Child  6– 0.0054 –0.5 0.1948
Married –0.0504 –3.58 0.4727
No. of observations 13,202 21,618
Source: IERAL database.
Notes: dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. z is the test of the underlying coeﬃ-
cient being 0. See table 6A.1 for description of the variables.worker was employed on a full-time basis. Growth in part-time employ-
ment plays an important role in the expansion of nonregistered employ-
ment.
Finally, we ﬁnd that larger ﬁrms are more likely to oﬀer regulated jobs.
To summarize, the probit analysis conﬁrms that the regulations tend to
segment the market and provide protection to those workers with greater
human capital. In other words, the regulatory structure is regressive, and
whatever protection it might provide does not appear to beneﬁt those
people who are objectively worse oﬀ. At the same time, the results show the
natural response one would anticipate from rational private decision mak-
ing. Sectors more exposed to supervision and control (namely, larger ﬁrms)
are more compliant with regulations.
6.3.2 Eﬀects on Earnings
The previous section established that labor market regulations unequiv-
ocally aﬀect labor market outcomes in nonrandom ways. It is clear that
some groups of workers have a greater chance of having jobs that are un-
der legally enforced regulations. What we have not established, though, is
whether workers and ﬁrms with those jobs sacriﬁce something. That is,
could it be that a regulated job pays less than a nonregulated one?
One should expect employment protection practices to aﬀect both sides
of the labor market: workers and employers. Costs to employers depend
not only on the wages paid and the beneﬁt package included but also on la-
bor productivity. Employers should be indiﬀerent to the composition of
the total compensation between money wages and beneﬁts.
Employees have preferences between wages and beneﬁts. A crucial pa-
rameter when analyzing the size and composition of employer-provided
beneﬁts is the wage workers are willing to forgo to obtain beneﬁts. The
market value of these trade-oﬀs between wages and fringe beneﬁts is an old
research question. This is a diﬃcult empirical issue that, in the literature,
does not appear to be resolved. The theoretically predicted negative trade-
oﬀ has been diﬃcult to uncover.19
In this section we present some estimates of a hedonic wage function. We
expect a negative relationship between wages and beneﬁts if productivity is
eﬀectively held constant. The problem, of course, is to hold productivity
constant in practice. If there are unobserved factors aﬀecting productivity,
the negative trade-oﬀ is no longer true, since beneﬁts may be related to the
unobserved productivity factors.
Econometric Problems
The worker’s decision to accept a job depends on his or her subjective
evaluation of the characteristics of the package. In equilibrium, this inter-
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19. For a discussion see Smith and Ehrenberg (1983), Leibowitz (1983), and Oi (1983).action of workers and employers should yield a locus of job matches that
trace out the rate at which the market trades oﬀ wages and beneﬁts. In our
empirical formulation, we use an extended Mincerian framework.
The regression model we estimate is
(1) Ln Yi,t    t    tXi,t    Regs    i,t,
where Ln Yi,t is the natural log of monthly individual (i) earnings at time t.
Xi,t is a vector of individual and ﬁrm characteristics that encompasses var-
iables such as education, experience, ﬁrm size, sector of employment, and
so on. Regulations (Regs) reports the legally enforced fringe beneﬁts that
characterize the match. The theoretical arguments suggested   should be
negative.20
There are several econometric problems that must be handled. The ﬁrst
one is the typical Heckman sample selection bias: We observe wages only
for those employed, not for those that decided not to join the labor force.
The result is that the conditional mean for the subsample exceeds the mean
for the whole distribution. In this situation a straightforward ordinary
least squares (OLS) estimate, not corrected for selectivity bias, would be in-
consistent. Our estimation strategy takes this problem into consideration
and implements a multilayered decision process.
An important issue in Mincer-type equations is that of unobserved het-
erogeneity. This comes from the fact that people diﬀer in their ability and
capacity to acquire human capital. This misspeciﬁcation error typically re-
sults in inconsistent estimates of parameters. To somewhat mitigate this
problem we will condition on tenure on the job. Hopefully, an individual
with longer tenure is one who evidences greater abilities, at least in regard
to his current position.21
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20. To empirically prove the rather simple theory, we need data that do not normally exist
in standard household surveys. In the case of Argentina the PHS is the only source. Workers
report whether they get regulatory coverage. Unfortunately some fringe beneﬁts can only be
found in ﬁrm-level data sets. High-ability workers (highly motivated, dependable, aggressive)
oftentimes receive higher wages and higher fringe beneﬁts. These beneﬁts, which are not pro-
portional to wages, are very diﬃcult to measure.
21. An additional problem springs out of measurement error. It is very likely that those
workers that are not covered by regulations underreport their true earnings. If this source of
measurement error was present we could get reverse signs in our estimated coeﬃcients on reg-
ulations. Now, regulatory beneﬁts could misleadingly turn out greater reported earnings, even
though true returns are lower. One could interpret the coeﬃcient on pensions as controlling
for this bias and focus the analysis on the coeﬃcients for the other variables. The problem,
however, remains in that pensions and the other regulations are highly correlated. Further-
more, regulations could be a last recourse to remain competitive. The wages ineﬃcient ﬁrms
pay are lower than those of the high-productivity, law-abiding ﬁrms. The observed “black”
matches could then report lower wages. To introduce some controls for ﬁrm eﬃciency we use
the only two pieces of information in the household survey relating to ﬁrms: ﬁrm size and sec-
tor. Of course, many other sources of unobserved productivity diﬀerences remain.
Since our estimates are conducted on an artiﬁcial panel (stacked cross sections), another
serious problem threatens the reliability of the estimates. If the economy has been subject to
large structural shocks, as indeed it has, then the returns to human capital or the wage bar-Econometric Speciﬁcation
The regression model we estimate follows, to a great extent, Heckman’s
(1979) suggestions. We further take into account the diﬀerence between the
decision to participate in a job search and that of accepting a job oﬀer. This
diﬀerence takes particular importance in an environment with high unem-
ployment, such as that observed in the 1990s. Formally, we estimate the
likelihood of the individual’s reporting income as arising from a bivariate
probit considering the individual’s decision to join the labor force as well
as his or her probability of ﬁnding a job.
The Model
To estimate the rates of return of the diﬀerent educational levels, a linear
version of equation (1) is estimated:
(2) Ln Y∗        X    Regs   ,
where Xis the matrix of independent variables aﬀecting the individual’s in-
come level and   is the vector of disturbances. The coeﬃcients of educa-
tion in equation (2) are the average returns to education.
This equation, if estimated by OLS—ignoring the two sources of selec-
tivity bias—can lead to biased parameters. To deal with that problem Heck-
man (1979) proposed estimating a model of two simultaneous equations,
with the endogenous variables being the income and the unobservable reser-
vation wage. In a context of high unemployment, the probability of ﬁnding
a job and reporting income need not be random or identical to the decision
to participate. For this reason, a second-stage Heckman correction was in-
troduced. Details of the model can be found in Tunalli (1982).
The likelihood of the individual’s reporting income is estimated from a
bivariate probit considering both the individual’s decision to join the labor
force and his likelihood of getting a job.
Thus, it is assumed that
(3) I∗
1i      Zi    1i
and
(4) I∗
2i      W i    2i,
where Zi and W i are independent variables and I∗
1i and I∗
2i are nonobserv-
able variables associated with an individual’s decision to participate and
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gaining conditions are likely to have changed drastically over time. We introduced a year ﬁxed
eﬀect to absorb some of those changes. Pessino (1995) argues that these changes have con-
siderably aﬀected outcomes in the labor market. Garcia (1996) has shown that the Argentine
skill premium has moved remarkably over the last few years. He ﬁnds that large changes in
relative prices (associated to trade reform and deregulation) and technological change explain
the large demand shifts necessary to explain the skill premium movements.his success in obtaining employment, respectively. What we observe are
those individuals that participate and those that obtained employment.
To summarize, the two-step decision process appears in table 6.4.
The equations to be estimated are
(5) I∗
1i,t      Zit    1i
(6) I∗
2i,t      W it    2i
(7) Ln Y it∗    it Xit    Regs    3i
Corr( 1i,  3i)    13
Corr( 2i,  3i)    23
Corr( 1i,  2i)    12
Following Heckman’s two-step procedure, we estimate equation
(8) Ln Y∗
it      it Xi,t    Regs    1 1i    2 2i   v1i,
where  1y 2 are the well-known inverse Mill’s ratios
(9)  1   f( 12,   Zit,   W it) and  1    13 3,
(10)  2   f( 12,   W it,   Zit) and  2    23 3.
The Data
Again, we use pooled PHS data for 1975–1997. Workers report their reg-
ulatory status there. The questions are quite speciﬁc and focus mainly on
legally enforced beneﬁts with details for each of them: severance payments,
paid holidays, sick leave, social security, and so on. The possible combina-
tions are sixty-four. However, coverage is highly correlated: Workers who
are registered in the social security system typically have the right to sever-
ance payments as well as the rest of legal beneﬁts. Otherwise they don’t
have any beneﬁts. For this reason, we deﬁne the Regs variable as 1/0. Vol-
untary fringe beneﬁts provided by employers are not reported to the PHS.22
We included the following variables.
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Table 6.4 Two-Step Selectivity Bias Process: Individual
Decision Process Labor Force Status Decision Process Job Status Income
I1 0 Nonparticipant Unobserved
1 Participant I2 0 Unemployed Unobserved
1 Employed Observed
Source: IREAL database.
22. It is likely that these beneﬁts are most valuable to the highest-wage employees. This
could result in a bias arising from the omission of some kind of fringe beneﬁts.X: Human capital (educational level, Mincerian experience)   current job
tenure
Job status: category, occupation (self-employed, wage earner), ﬁrm size,
branch of activity
Regs: 1 if the person is covered by labor legislation, 0 otherwise
Z: including marital status, head of household, number of children, chil-
dren under six years (0 or 1).
W: including Z plus job status
Table 6.5 reports the results for females and males separately. We chose
to report here the estimates for two-step and OLS regressions.23 We intro-
duced year ﬁxed eﬀects.
As can be seen in the tables, the estimates show an economically and sta-
tistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of regulations on earnings. Males appear to sac-
riﬁce about 8 percent of their earnings when regulations are present. Fe-
males, on the other hand, sacriﬁce less, though still a signiﬁcant amount:
2.8 percent of their earnings. It is intuitive that females present lower co-
eﬃcients. Since the reduction in earnings will come out of the equilibrium
match, and since both the demand and the supply sides are likely to shift
down with regulations, one would anticipate that the movement would be
smaller as the supply side becomes more elastic. There is considerable evi-
dence that the female labor supply is more elastic than that for men.
Results in table 6.5 show estimated returns to schooling and experience,
as well as those to tenure, to be rather strong and consistent with the liter-
ature. The size of the corporation where the individual works is also quite
important. Large corporations appear to be more productive and accord-
ingly pay higher wages (conditional on regulatory beneﬁts).
In summary, our results indicate that regulations do have an important
impact on earnings. While we cannot say that they are welfare reducing, it
is quite obvious that a job with regulatory coverage does not come for free.
One must sacriﬁce earnings in order to have access to this coverage. At this
point it is very important to emphasize that we have estimated reduced
forms. Hence, no inference on the elasticity of labor demand or on the mar-
ginal rate of substitution in welfare can be made. Yet the result is quite il-
luminating, particularly when paired with those of the previous subsec-
tion.
Regulations are not distributed fairly. They tend to beneﬁt those with
higher earning potential and do segment the market. Those that do get
some coverage, however, must sacriﬁce a portion of their earnings. Still, as
we just mentioned, we have not connected the potential impact of regula-
tions to labor demand. For this reason, it is diﬃcult to make any structural
inferences as to how the market would clear once these regulations are
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23. Tables 6A.3 and 6A.4 report results of the selection process.Table 6.5 Regression Results: Trade-Oﬀ Wages–Fringe Beneﬁts (pooled PHS data
1975–1997; dependent variable: Lnyh)
Females Males





Primary .1199 .3343 .2210 .2475
(5.191)∗∗∗ (8.184)∗∗∗ (14.131)∗∗∗ (18.039)∗∗∗
High school .5649 .886 .6799 .7589
(21.62)∗∗∗ (18.349)∗∗∗ (31.033)∗∗∗ (47.85)∗∗∗
College 1.0448 1.3646 1.264 1.3857
(12.315)∗∗∗ (24.691)∗∗∗ (44.595)∗∗∗ (69.289)∗∗∗
Experience .0256 .0371 .013 .0312
(7.216)∗∗∗ (11.856)∗∗∗ (4.448)∗∗∗ (24.885)∗∗∗
Experience∗∗2 –.003 –.005 –.008 –.004
(–4.515)∗∗∗ (–8.293)∗∗∗ (–1.463) (–17.420)∗∗∗
Tenure .0064 .0056 .0072 .0071
(7.956)∗∗∗ (4.161)∗∗∗ (16.579)∗∗∗ (16.351)∗∗∗
Manufacturing –.1085 .0368 .0458 .0479
(5.100)∗∗∗ (.912) (3.212)∗∗∗ (3.352)∗∗∗
Public Services .1212 .1299 .1402 .1428
(1.477) (.617) (3.241)∗∗∗ (3.294)∗∗∗
Construction/Maids .1587 .3129 .0088 .0116
(6.401)∗∗∗ (6.797)∗∗∗ (.503) (.664)
Retail –.1800 –.0401 –.003 –.0033
(–.7329) (–.922) (–.198) (–.213)
Private Services .1307 .2563 .0632 .0648
(5.937)∗∗∗ (6.113)∗∗∗ (4.367)∗∗∗ (4.47)∗∗∗
Public Administration .0119 .1052 –.0094 –.0105
(.583) (2.621)∗∗∗ (–.489) (–.542)
Social Services .1666 .3116 .0089 .0061
(3.226)∗∗∗ (3.963)∗∗∗ (.336) (.23)
Size5 .0063 .2158 .008 .0018
(.238) (4.335)∗∗∗ (.049) (.112)
Size  25 .0682 .2875 .0785 .0811
(2.685)∗∗∗ (5.850)∗∗∗ (4.801)∗∗∗ (4.954)∗∗∗
Size  100 0.0984 .3072 .1346 .1384
(3.804)∗∗∗ (6.037)∗∗∗ (7.697)∗∗∗ (7.900)∗∗∗
Largest .1654 .3953 .2222 .2278
(2.89)∗∗∗ (7.739)∗∗∗ (13.236)∗∗∗ (13.553)∗∗∗
Self .0762 .0682 .0474 .0538
(3.996)∗∗∗ (2.047)∗∗∗ (3.605)∗∗∗ (4.091)∗∗∗
Regs –.0284 –.0039 –0.0826 –.0757
(–1.687) (–.123) (–7.363)∗∗∗ (–.6744)∗∗∗
Constant 1.7757 1.0312 10.7873 10.435
(10.561)∗∗∗ (13.262)∗∗∗ (221.212)∗∗∗ (345.769)∗∗∗
Adjusted R2 .8709 0.9612
Source: IERAL database.
Note: See table 6A.1 for description of the variables. Absolute value of t-statistics in paren-
theses.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.eliminated. In the next section, we turn to a diﬀerent exercise and estimate
labor demand for a large number of manufacturing ﬁrms in Argentina.
6.4 Labor Demand Estimation
We argued previously that most of the regulatory impact would operate
through the demand for labor. Theoretical arguments suggest that regula-
tions in the form of taxes will have a negative impact on employment and/
or wages. Contributions to social security are typically thought to aﬀect
negatively the demand for labor as well, since the eﬀects through labor
supply are probably modest (in countries like Argentina, where workers do
not perceive the contributions as deferred or indirect wages, this eﬀect is
likely to be very small). Theory, however, provides relatively less guidance
over the eﬀects of severance payments on employment. While they are
likely to change the ease with which payroll is managed, it is not clear that
they reduce the aggregate demand for labor. It appears crucial to have an
empirical estimate of how ﬁrms respond, in their labor demand decisions,
to the presence of regulations.
Hamermesh (1986), summarizing the literature, provides empirical esti-
mates of the employment/labor cost elasticities for various industrial coun-
tries. He found the parameter to be low in the sample (.1 to .5), suggesting
that policies that increase the ﬁxed cost of employment may reduce the em-
ployment-hours ratio only slightly. However, these elasticities could be bi-
ased downward as they may reﬂect the eﬀect of prevailing job security, since
these regulations would have induced a substitution away from labor. Less
controversial than the eﬀect of job security on the adjustment process is its
eﬀect on employment. An increase in job security increases the cost of hir-
ing due to changes in expected future severance payments and the cost of
forgone output due to potential mismatches. In the context of shocks to
output, ﬁrms must strike a balance between hiring more workers and wait-
ing a few periods to forgo the high potential future severance payment.
This section presents the results of estimating a homogeneous labor de-
mand equation with a previously unexploited balanced panel of Argentine
manufacturing ﬁrms. Our empirical analysis considers the adjustment of
employment and hours over the 1990–1996 period.
One of the rich features of the data set is the availability of employment
and hours worked. Since some of the eﬀects of stiﬀening regulations are
likely to be a more intense use of hours, we are likely to uncover features here
that papers with more aggregate data sources cannot. Of particular interest
is the adjustment in the intensive margin (hours) that can follow an increase
in the perceived cost of severance. For instance, increases in the demand for
goods accompanied by higher severance costs are likely to lead to a reason-
ably constant level of employment but a more intense use of overtime.
Panel data estimations such as those pursued here present some draw-
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the variability of regulations. In particular, as mentioned before, there were
relatively few changes in the period under consideration, and those that
took place happened toward the end of the sample. In any event, as we will
see, the eﬀects of regulations come out strongly and highly signiﬁcant. A
second limitation is that the period was one of extraordinary change in a
number of dimensions: a large number of ﬁrm deaths and births (unfortu-
nately not adequately captured by the sampling technique used to create
the panel) and, most remarkably, a period of such strenuous ﬁrm reengi-
neering that it casts some concerns over the values of long-run elasticities.
On the other hand, the high variance in some of the forcing variables allows
a more eﬃcient estimation of the parameters.
6.4.1 The Model
Our empirical approach models labor demand through a fairly general
setting. We characterize employment choices as the dynamic interaction of
employment and hours adjusting to ﬂuctuations in output, factor prices,
and regulations. While the system that will be estimated is unconstrained,
the speciﬁcations for the demand system correspond to a substantial num-
ber of production structures.24 The system is summarized by the following
two equations:
(11) Ln Et    1    2 Ln Et k    3 Ln Regs    4 Ln Ht k
  Ln Sat    LinP t   ε1t
(12) Ln Ht    1    2 Ln Ht k    3 Ln Regs    4 Ln Et k
  Ln Sat    LinP t   ε2t,
where Et is employment, Ht are production hours, P t is industrial produc-
tion. Regs measures the cost equivalence of regulations, which presumably
aﬀect not just the level of demand but also the dynamics. Finally, Sat cap-
tures the product wage.
The model assumes that employers seek to maximize the expected value
of current and future proﬁt and that the cost of adjusting labor input is a
quadratic function of the size of the adjustment made.
The speciﬁcation is quite ﬂexible. It is consistent with a number of pro-
duction structures with smooth substitution between workers and hours,
including varying degrees of returns to scale or what is even more likely, the
presence of imperfect competition in goods markets. In other words, the
model does not restrict the source of curvature of the proﬁt function.25
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24. The corresponding derivations may be consulted in Varian (1984), MasCollel, Whin-
ston, and Green (1995), Chambers (1988), and Hamermesh (1986, 1993).
25. For instance, the model is consistent with a setting where ﬁrms are imperfectly com-
petitive and face constant marginal costs as well as with one where ﬁrms face a competitive
market with decreasing returns to labor.Given this generality, care must be taken to make explicit the maintained
hypotheses if the coeﬃcients are to be identiﬁed as technology parameters.
It is important to consider the theoretical model on which the speciﬁca-
tion is based so as to understand the true signiﬁcance of the parameters. If
the production process is assumed to have the features of a Cobb-Douglas
production function, labor costs and production parameters are interpreted
as labor and return-to-scale parameters, respectively. If, on the other hand,
it is assumed that a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production
function explains the model better, the corresponding coeﬃcients represent
the capital-labor substitution elasticity and the scale parameter, respec-
tively. In any case, in the estimations presented herein, no restrictions on
production function or underlying cost structure will be imposed.
6.4.2 Econometric Speciﬁcation
The system represented by equations (11) and (12) presents a number of
econometric problems that must be addressed.
First, the model, being based on a panel, will be estimated with ﬁxed
eﬀects to control for ﬁrm idiosyncratic factors. We will also introduce a
quarter dummy to correct for any seasonality in the unadjusted data.26
Under most reasonable assumptions (local returns to scale, imperfect
competition, bargaining structures, and so on) ﬁrm output and shocks to
the demand decision are likely to be correlated. The same can be said about
real wage determination. This, of course, requires the estimation through
instrumental variables. At a micro level, the choice of instruments becomes
a bit easier than in aggregate models. However, ﬁnding ﬁrm-speciﬁc in-
struments proved to be very diﬃcult as the data set did not include truly ex-
ogenous variables. For this reason, we used a number of aggregate vari-
ables and estimated diﬀerent correlations for each ﬁrm.27 The instruments
used are aggregate GDP, the speciﬁc branch openness indicator (export
plus imports over output), aggregate unemployment rate, price of capital
equipment index, log of ratio of wholesale prices to consumer prices, and
lagged values of all variables. We report results from OLS and instrumen-
tal variables (IV) estimations. Following Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992),
we did not expect labor demand to be stable over the ﬁrm’s cycle.28 To par-
tially account for this we deﬁned a dummy variable to capture recessions
and expansions when instrumenting. We deﬁned both states as occurring
when the real output (log) growth reached a threshold arbitrarily imposed
(see table 6A.5 for details).
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26. Theory indicates that when estimating labor demand conditioned on production (not
value added) we should include other factor prices. Nonlabor inputs were unavailable for the
estimation.
27. The instruments, while the same for each ﬁrm, did vary in that they were not restricted
to share the same ﬁrst-stage coeﬃcients for all ﬁrms.
28. Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992) argue that a lowering in ﬁring cost aﬀects more ﬁring
decisions than hiring ones.The model speciﬁcation introduces an unrestricted dynamic adjust-
ment. This is motivated via a cost of adjustment technology that depends
in part on the hurdles imposed by regulations. The speciﬁcation we chose
was to introduce up to three lags to capture all seasonal as well as inertial
factors. To allow for a richer interaction with hours, we also introduced
lagged terms of hours in the employment equation and vice versa. As for
adjustment costs, we also introduced as an explanatory variable the price
of overtime hours. Presumably, an increase in the number of (relative) over-
time hours should induce an increase in the level of employment next pe-
riod. The fact that overtime hours are being used at all is probably a good
indicator of signiﬁcant adjustment costs.29
6.4.3 The Data
The data set includes a sample of 1,398 manufacturing private ﬁrms. The
panel does not provide much information on the type of ﬁrms included.
For instance, we have no knowledge of whether the employment relations
are informal. The panel presents other problems, too. Not all ﬁrms sys-
tematically answer all questions. Similarly, many ﬁrms drop out of the
sample, and the replacement criterion is not clear. The panel does not in-
clude newly created ﬁrms. We report results from estimating a restricted
balanced panel and an unbalanced one. The balanced panel drops all those
ﬁrms that do not answer the relevant questions or that have dropped out of
the sample, leaving 200 ﬁrms in the data set with all the complete answers
for the whole period. Clearly, this decision could create a selectivity bias
problem.30The unbalanced panel, on the other hand, clears out those ﬁrms
that do not answer the relevant questions in all quarters. The number of re-
maining ﬁrms was 549 out of the original 1,398.31 Sources and additional
details concerning the data are explained in appendix B.
The available data are in index number format. The deﬁnition of each
variable has its own complexities. We deﬁned employment as the total
number of workers within the ﬁrm (white and blue collar). Production is
measured via physical production as reported by ﬁrms. Multiproduct ﬁrms
aggregate it up according to a set of ﬁxed weights. There is no control for
changes in product design. Wages were deﬁned by dividing payroll ex-
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29. When estimating the interaction between hours and employment, it is clear that both
respond to a correlated set of innovations. In this paper we estimated them separately. A re-
ﬁnement would estimate them jointly, allowing for a free correlation between both residuals.
30. The problem is complex. First, the methodology claims to replace small ﬁrms in the
sample but not large ones. Second, we cannot distinguish between ﬁrms that did not answer
because they decided not to do so (perhaps out of taxation fears) and the ones that were
closed. Finally, there is no information in the data to allow us to identify ﬁrms that are likely
to be dropped out of the sample to attempt a solution to the selectivity bias (i.e., we have no
way in which to identify if a ﬁrm is large or small).
31. We considered the possibility of reweighting the panel, but it proved impossible because
in the balanced panel entire branches were lost. Therefore, we did not have any criteria for ex-
panding the sample.penses by the number of employees. Since we have data on expenses due to
overtime hours, we netted them out to compute regular wages. The survey
does not include product price information. We estimated the real wage as
the ratio of wages to wholesale prices for the sector. For description of the
variables see table 6A.5.
Table 6.6shows some features of the ﬁrms in our sample. The table pres-
ents average growth rates for a few variables. LnReg is the variable that en-
compasses labor regulation costs. We included payroll taxes: pensions,
family allowances, health care system, and PAMI (see table 6.2 for details).
We also introduced a measure of expected severance payments (ESP). We
did not include other labor regulations due to the diﬃculties involved in
imputing costs. This was the case with paid holidays, sick leave, and spe-
ciﬁc collective agreement provisions.
The Index of Regulations Construction
LnReg is estimated every period for each branch of activity. LnReg has
two main components: taxes and ESP. Expected severance payment is cal-
culated as percentage of normal wage through the following formula:
(13) ESP it   Uit   F it   T it   P it,
where i refers to ﬁrm’s branch of activity and t refers to time (quarter and
year); U is the unemployment rate, F is the percentage of ﬁred people over
unemployment; T is average tenure, and P is the probability of having the
right to severance (the fraction of formal wage earners over total wage
earners). Each period we have as many ESPs as branches of activities ag-
gregated at two digits of the third revision of the Clasiﬁcación Industrial
International Uniforme (CIIU). Because the PHS is gathered twice a year
and we have quarterly data, we use the same ﬁgure for every two quarters
of the Manufacturing Industrial Survey.
We add the taxes to ESP to obtain the full cost of regulation as a pro-
portion of wages.
Labor Market Regulations on Employment Decisions by Firms: Argentina 373





Total wage 10.9 10.6
Hourly wage 7.5 9.9
Regulation cost –1.3 4.0
Output 8.0 5.7
Source: IERAL database.
Notes: Column (1) is based on extremes values on the series; column (2) is based on the slope
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(14) Regsit   ESP it   Taxesit
The variable is expressed as an index base 1990   100 and expressed in
logarithm for the regressions. The behavior of the diﬀerent components of
the index is illustrated in ﬁgure 6.4.
6.4.4 Results
Table 6.7presents some OLS results. Our ﬁrst speciﬁcation treats output
as exogenous. Estimates for jobs and hours are reported for the unbalanced
and the balanced panel, respectively. We estimated introducing individual
ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, correcting for serial correlation. The reported z-score is
heteroskedasticity consistent.
The results show that all variables are statistically signiﬁcant. A 1 per-
cent increase in real wages decreases the level of employment 0.15 percent
while hours go down 0.20 percent. A common pattern in our results and
the literature is that hours appear more responsive to changes in costs or
scale factors. This is probably the eﬀect of costs of adjustment. Theory in-
dicates that with costly changes in manpower a ﬁrm is much more likely to
rely on adjustments in hours per worker than on the number of jobs of-
fered.32
As we mentioned in the introduction, eyeballing the data leads to the im-
Fig. 6.4 Decomposition of expected severance payment
Source: IERAL database.
32. It must be remembered, however, that overtime hours are costlier, and thus ﬁrms have
to take this into account.pression that Argentina’s job market showed apparent low responsiveness
of employment to output. Our OLS estimates show that, in manufacturing,
when output grows 1 percent, hours increase 6–7 percent and workers 10–
12 percent on impact.
A feature of the results is that output and wage elasticities are higher in
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Table 6.7 Manufacturing Survey: OLS Results
Unbalanced Panel Balanced Panel
Employment Hours per Worker Employment Hours per Worker
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Normal Wage –0.151 –0.197 –0.119 –0.180
(21.23)∗∗∗ (41.78)∗∗∗ (14.40)∗∗∗ (29.63)∗∗∗
Output 0.117 0.061 0.103 0.071
(33.22)∗∗∗ (24.22)∗∗∗ (20.01)∗∗∗ (17.08)∗∗∗
Output_1 –0.048 –0.023 –0.049 –0.035
(12.50)∗∗∗ (8.23)∗∗∗ (8.94)∗∗∗ (7.95)∗∗∗
Overtime Wage 0.015 0.063 0.018 0.062
(8.21)∗∗∗ (49.52)∗∗∗ (7.03)∗∗∗ (31.46)∗∗∗
Employment_1 0.815 –0.059 0.878 –0.077
(88.69)∗∗∗ (9.06)∗∗∗ (64.26)∗∗∗ (7.13)∗∗∗
Employment_2 –0.239 0.026 –0.277 0.051
(21.48)∗∗∗ (3.28)∗∗∗ (15.67)∗∗∗ (3.64)∗∗∗
Employment_3 0.275 –0.030 0.270 –0.023
(31.17)∗∗∗ (4.72)∗∗∗ (20.41)∗∗∗ (2.19)∗∗
Hours per Worker_1 0.022 0.172 0.037 0.251
(2.00)∗∗ (21.57)∗∗∗ (2.42)∗∗∗ (20.37)∗∗∗
Hours per Worker_2 0.073 0.001 0.007 0.015
(6.56)∗∗∗ (0.16) (0.50) (1.30)
Hours per Worker_3 0.042 0.014 0.084 0.033
(4.13)∗∗∗ (1.87)∗∗ (6.46)∗∗∗ (3.18)∗∗∗
Second quarter –0.033 0.100 –0.040 0.100
(7.89)∗∗∗ (33.32)∗∗∗ (8.57)∗∗∗ (25.99)∗∗∗
Third quarter –0.032 0.099 –0.032 0.089
(7.39)∗∗∗ (31.49)∗∗∗ (6.44)∗∗∗ (22.32)∗∗∗
Fourth quarter –0.018 0.085 –0.015 0.075
(4.59)∗∗∗ (29.42)∗∗∗ (3.29)∗∗∗ (20.59)∗∗∗
Regulation –0.013 0.031 –0.009 0.028
(2.04)∗∗ (6.80)∗∗∗ (1.22) (4.82)∗∗∗
Constant 0.441 4.322 0.277 3.689
(5.20)∗∗∗ (70.69)∗∗∗ (2.63)∗∗∗ (42.81)∗∗∗
Adjusted R2 .89 .70 .86 .67
No. of observations 11,061 4,997
Source: IERAL database.
Notes: Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses. See table 6A.5 for description of the variables.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.the unbalanced panel than in the balanced one. Unfortunately, the selec-
tion rule to stay in the panel is unclear. Firms could die or simply not an-
swer in some periods. Thus, while the results are suggestive, there is no real
basis to conclude that regulations do have an impact in pushing ﬁrms into
bankruptcy.
The model reported in table 6.7 shows, in both panels, fairly similar re-
sults. Employment and hours appear sensitive to wages. Remarkably, the
cost of regulations (severance costs and taxes) always aﬀects signiﬁcantly
the demand for workers. The results, however, assumed that physical vol-
ume of production as well as wages could be treated as exogenous, ignor-
ing questions of simultaneity in the determination of output, employment,
and prices.
When using microdata the simultaneous problems of output determina-
tion and employment are typically avoided. The reason is simple: Under
perfect competition, demand is given and hence ﬁrms only choose how
many workers to hire. Unfortunately, in the case at hand, the assumption
of competitive markets may be a bit strict—at least for the ﬁrst few years
of the sample, when the economy was quite closed and few ﬁrms disputed
the local market. Under imperfect competition the decisions to hire work-
ers and sell goods are closely intertwined, and disturbances that aﬀect one
will probably aﬀect the other. For this reason we should instrument for
movements in ﬁnal goods demand.33
As for wages, ﬁrms have a limited say in the wage oﬀer. The institutional
setting in Argentina limits that discretion. Centralized bargaining restricts
the choices for a ﬁrm, and only upward deviations in wages are allowed.
Furthermore, the price deﬂator used to construct the real wage, just as the
level of output, is endogenous under imperfect competition. For this rea-
son, in table 6.8we report instrumental variable estimations assuming both
wage costs and output as jointly determined with employment.
The instrumental variable estimation makes little change in the short-
run output elasticities in the employment equations. The elasticity for the
hours equation, on the other hand, doubles. Interestingly, it appears that
the endogeneity problem was more serious for the hours equation—the
margin where most changes would take place when in the presence of ad-
justment costs. This pattern is present in both tables and is most remark-
able in the unbalanced panel estimates.
The responsiveness of employment to changes in wage costs is a bit more
of a concern. When we only instrument for output, the elasticity remains
stable at a 0.15–0.20 level (in the unbalanced panel case). However, when
we instrument for the potential endogeneity of wages, the cost elasticity
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33. Table 6A.6 shows the results of instrumenting the level of output assuming wages to be
exogenous.Table 6.8 Manufacturing Survey, IV-Endogenous: Wages and Product
Unbalanced Panel Balanced Panel
Employment Hours per Worker Employment Hours per Worker
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Est. Normal Wage –0.118 –0.022 –0.041 –0.038
(10.27)∗∗∗ (2.61)∗∗∗ (3.09)∗∗∗ (3.61)∗∗∗
Est. Output 0.110 0.103 0.050 0.124
(9.72)∗∗∗ (12.11)∗∗∗ (3.68)∗∗∗ (10.75)∗∗∗
Output_1 –0.042 –0.045 –0.030 –0.065
(6.61)∗∗∗ (9.30)∗∗∗ (3.58)∗∗∗ (9.04)∗∗∗
Overtime Wage 0.016 0.062 0.022 0.055
(6.29)∗∗∗ (32.96)∗∗∗ (6.61)∗∗∗ (20.37)∗∗∗
Employment_1 0.825 –0.056 0.910 –0.071
(76.24)∗∗∗ (6.94)∗∗∗ (59.58)∗∗∗ (5.50)∗∗∗
Employment_2 –0.260 0.042 –0.317 0.063
(19.16)∗∗∗ (4.00)∗∗∗ (16.03)∗∗∗ (3.64)∗∗∗
Employment_3 0.310 –0.051 0.294 –0.032
(28.22)∗∗∗ (6.29)∗∗∗ (20.14)∗∗∗ (2.66)∗∗∗
Hours per Worker_1 0.038 0.202 0.015 0.279
(2.90)∗∗∗ (20.70)∗∗∗ (0.85) (19.08)∗∗∗
Hours per Worker_2 0.076 –0.015 0.001 0.021
(5.99)∗∗∗ (1.51) (0.05) (1.47)
Hours per Worker_3 0.036 0.013 0.051 0.026
(2.95)∗∗∗ (1.42) (3.34)∗∗∗ (2.05)∗∗
Second quarter –0.028 0.123 –0.033 0.112
(5.97)∗∗∗ (33.08)∗∗∗ (6.24)∗∗∗ (24.36)∗∗∗
Third quarter –0.029 0.122 –0.021 0.105
(5.74)∗∗∗ (31.44)∗∗∗ (3.87)∗∗∗ (22.08)∗∗∗
Fourth quarter –0.020 0.100 –0.013 0.084
(4.11)∗∗∗ (27.50)∗∗∗ (2.40)∗∗∗ (18.95)∗∗∗
Regulation –0.022 –0.012 –0.021 –0.003
(3.04)∗∗∗ (2.15)∗∗ (2.59)∗∗∗ (0.45)
Constant 0.159 3.548 0.310 2.989
(1.53) (43.68)∗∗∗ (2.54)∗∗∗ (27.35)∗∗∗
Adjusted R2 .89 .72 .86 .69
No. of observations 10,532 4,997
Source: IERAL database.
Notes: Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses. Instruments are normal wage_1; output_2; out-
put_3; output_4, consumer price index, capital services price index, wholesale price index, aggregate un-
employment index, dce; dca. See table 6A.5 for description of the variables.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.drops substantially in both equations, with a more dramatic impact on the
hours one. Since we measure wages by dividing the wage bill by employ-
ment we could have introduced an upward bias in the least square esti-
mates of the labor cost elasticity.
Hours appear less responsive than jobs to ﬂuctuations in costs or scale
factors. Theory indicates that with costly changes in manpower, a ﬁrm is
much more likely to rely on adjustment in hours than on the number of jobs
oﬀered. We failed to ﬁnd support to these arguments, as other studies us-
ing quarterly data had previously done (Hamermesh 1993, chap. 7).
When we consider the regulatory burden the results change. To begin
with, as regulations get stiﬀer, employment drops more than hours. That is,
ﬁrms substitute away from both types of labor: workers and hours. Work-
ers and hours thus appear to be p-complements. An increase of 1 percent in
the estimated regulatory burden produces a short-run drop in employment
of around 0.02 percent, while hours would drop by 0.01 or 0.003 percent
(unbalanced and balanced, respectively). This is exactly what we would
have expected. As regulations get tighter, ﬁrms are more likely to get rid of
workers. It is quite remarkable that regulations do have this eﬀect, which is
completely counter to that sought by regulators. Job security provisions
are typically introduced to protect workers, yet they tend to reduce the
number of jobs and increase only in the margin the eﬀort demanded from
those who can preserve theirs.
To summarize, upon impact, the presence of regulations seems disturb-
ing for the behavior of the labor market. Theoretically, in the presence of
high ﬁxed costs ﬁrms could substitute away from labor into capital or other
inputs. Yet, while ﬁrms have to pay the additional hours at the overtime
rate ( 50 percent/ 100 percent) plus proportional payroll taxes,34 the ex-
pected severance payments are invariant since the regulation recognizes
the straight-time rate as the severance cost. Hence, the theoretical elastic-
ity prediction is ambiguous.35 Our results suggest that an increase in the
regulatory burden reduces the employment-hours ratio somewhat. But the
negative eﬀect on total workers and hours employment indicates substitu-
tion away from labor.
Robustness
The cost of severance was calculated using sector-speciﬁc data. It is pos-
sible, however, that some sectors with low employment levels might also
show high turnover rates. Under those circumstances, the cost of severance
would be high and a spurious negative correlation might develop. The less
378 Guillermo Mondino and Silvia Montoya
34. Table 6.2 showed that 92 percent of nonwage labor costs are social security contribu-
tions proportional to wages.
35. The long-run trade-oﬀ between jobs and standard hours has been diﬃcult to ﬁnd in the
literature. See Hamermesh (1993).time variability the index of regulations shows, the more severe the prob-
lem could be. That is, when most of the regulation variability comes from
the between component across sectors, other unobserved components
could explain the sign and size of the estimated coeﬃcient.
To check for the existence of spurious correlation we run our labor de-
mand equations on an aggregate index of regulations. That is, we recalcu-
lated the index of regulation for the whole of manufacturing. Now the in-
dex becomes
(15) Regst   Taxest   ESP t   Ut   F t   T t   P t,
where U is aggregate unemployment rate, F is the fraction of the unem-
ployed that were laid oﬀ, T is average tenure, and P is the probability of
having severance payment (the percentage of formal wage earners over to-
tal wage earners). The results are reported in table 6.9.
Little changes from the results previously reported. The wage elasticity
is somewhat lower but roughly equivalent. The output elasticity remains
the same. Lagged terms remain invariant as well, insuring that the dy-
namics will look the same. Finally, the impact of regulations on employ-
ment is even stronger than the one previously reported. Now the impact
elasticity climbs to 0.09, a level equivalent to that of wages. The eﬀect on
hours appears to dwindle away. The coeﬃcient is now economically and
statistically indistinguishable from zero (and the sign becomes positive).
Overall, the speciﬁcation appears robust to this source of spurious corre-
lation.
It would seem appealing to evaluate the diﬀerential impact that the
diﬀerent components of the regulatory index have on employment. In table
6.10 we report the results of conducting three exercises. All of them limit
the time variability and focus on the cross-sectional factors. The ﬁrst,
which we call option A, holds unemployment and the probability of hav-
ing been laid oﬀ ﬁxed at the mean for the period. Option B assumes that
the tenure structure has remained constant over time. Option C holds un-
employment, the fraction of those laid oﬀ, and the probability of access to
severance payments constant.
Somewhat limiting the time variability of the index of regulations has a
very modest eﬀect on our estimates. In all cases, the job elasticity increases.
At the same time, hours respond less, turning economically and statisti-
cally insigniﬁcant. All other parameters remain largely unaﬀected.
The deleterious eﬀects of regulations on employment seem robust to al-
ternative speciﬁcations. Neither restricting the cross section nor restricting
the time series variability appears capable of reducing the size or signiﬁ-
cance of the estimates. In fact, in all cases the impact elasticity increases,
sometimes making them equivalent to the wage cost. Conversely, in the
case for hours, the eﬀects are weakened.
Labor Market Regulations on Employment Decisions by Firms: Argentina 3796.4.5 Dynamics: The Speed of Adjustment
So far we have discussed the static, short-run response of employment
and hours to changes in wage costs, output, and labor regulations. Next we
turn to the adjustment process that ﬁrms will follow when one of these vari-
ables is shocked. We next present a set of graphs of the dynamic response
of ﬁrms to 10 percent changes in output, wages, or the costs of regulations.
380 Guillermo Mondino and Silvia Montoya
Table 6.9 Manufacturing Survey, IV-Endogenous: Wages and Product, Unbalanced
Panel (aggregated regulation index)
Employment Hours per Worker
(1) (2)
Est. Normal Wage –0.097 –0.032
(–7.834) (–3.628)














Hours per Worker_2 0.075 –0.028
(5.935) (–2.951)
Hours per Worker_3 0.037 0.013
(2.979) (1.471)
Second quarter –0.026 0.123
(–5.553) (32.769)
Third quarter –0.027 0.121
(–5.508) (30.734)






Adjusted R2 0.86 0.68
No. of observations 10,532 10,532
Source: IERAL database.
Notes:Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses. Regulation index  Uit Fit Tit Pit
  taxes, with i   sectors and t   quarters. Instruments are normal wage_1; output_2; out-
put_3; output_4, consumer price index, capital services price index, wholesale price index, ag-
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Fig. 6.5 Impulse-response function—change in total wage
Source: IERAL database and table 6.9.
Fig. 6.6 Impulse-response function—change in hourly wage
Source: IERAL database and table 6.9.Fig. 6.7 Impulse-response function—change in industrial output
Source: IERAL database and table 6.9.
Fig. 6.8 Impulse-response function—change in regulations
Source: IERAL database and table 6.9.The exercise is conducted based on the regressions previously presented in
table 6.8. We selected the unbalanced panel estimates. We allow for the in-
teraction between hours and employment as we shock both equations si-
multaneously. Figures 6.5 and 6.6show the response to a 10 percent change
in total wages and in hourly wages. Figures 6.7 and 6.8 illustrate the re-
sponse to a 10 percent increase in output and in regulatory costs.
The median lags are 1.5 and 2.5 years for output and wage shocks. They
also illustrate that the response is always greater in employment than in
hours. There we observe again the damaging eﬀect of regulations on labor
demand. This can only be the case when ﬁrms substitute workers in the ex-
tensive margin for hours in the intensive one. Firms increase almost 1 per-
cent the hours per worker, while an equivalent increase in wages would have
reduced employment 8 percent. The bivariate hours-workers microdata
estimation allows us to draw some important conclusions: Regulations do
have a negative impact on labor demand, and the impact grows over time.
Another interesting ﬁnding is that when we allow for dynamics we ﬁnd
that the response of employment to output is substantially higher than the
short-run estimate. While the short-run elasticity is fairly low, the long-run
response appears more respectable and close to 0.57.
Tables 6.11 and 6.12 present the estimated coeﬃcients and long-run re-
sponses of hours and employment. For comparison purposes we ﬁrst re-
produce the coeﬃcients from the labor demand model under diﬀerent as-
sumptions.
Table 6.11 presents estimates of the labor demand elasticity under the
diﬀerent models reported in tables 6.7 and 6.8 and IV-product reported in
table 6A.6. The median speed adjustment is among the values reported in
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Table 6.11 Labor Demand Coeﬃcients under Diﬀerence Alternatives
Wage




Hours — –0.197 0.031 0.038 — –0.063
Jobs –0.151 — –0.013 0.069 0.137 —
IV: product
Hours — –0.193 0.021 0.077 — –0.076
Jobs –0.173 — 0.000 0.076 0.163 —
IV: product and wages
Hours — –0.022 –0.012 0.058 — –0.065
Jobs –0.118 — –0.022 0.068 0.150 —
Source: IERAL database and tables 6.7, 6.8, and 6A.6.
Note: Dashes indicate data not available.
aIncludes one lag.
bIncludes three lags.386 Guillermo Mondino and Silvia Montoya
Table 6.12 Long-Run Labor Demand Elasticities under Diﬀerent Alternatives
Wage
Total Hours Regs Output
OLS
Hours 0.073 –0.226 0.042 –0.031
Jobs –0.946 –0.208 –0.049 0.603
IV: product
Hours 0.115 –0.219 0.030 0.037
Jobs –1.187 –0.274 –0.039 0.631
IV: product and wages
Hours 0.070 –0.025 –0.001 0.026
Median lags 9 1a 1a 1a
Jobs –0.860 –0.030 –0.177 0.575
Median lags 7 10 7 6
Source: IERAL database and tables 6.7, 6.8, and 6A.6.
aLess than 1 quarter.
the literature for estimates using quarterly data: 5.5 quarters for jobs and a
quicker adjustment for hours. The median for hours adjustment implies
al ag on the order of one quarter.
We consider the terms that describe the simultaneous adjustment of em-
ployment and hours. We found  EH   0 in our speciﬁcations suggesting
workers and hours to be dynamic p-complements. The estimate of  HE 0,
statistically signiﬁcant, with absolute values smaller than  EH in our speci-
ﬁcations suggesting workers and hours to be dynamic p-complements. Re-
sults suggest that for a 10 percent long-run decrease in employment there
is a 4 percent increase in the demand of hours per worker. The net eﬀect is
still a substitution away from labor.
Finally, table 6.12 provides long-run elasticities that can be bench-
marked with those previously found with aggregate data (see Montoya and
Navarro 1996; Pessino 1995). We found higher values for long-run elas-
ticities. Our results show an output elasticity in the long run of 0.575 per-
cent and 0.03 percent for workers and hours, respectively. The response
to wages is also important in the long run, with an estimated employment
elasticity of –0.86 percent.
6.5 Concluding Remarks
Argentina’s experience in the 1990s raises serious questions about the
adjustment of the labor market. While output was growing strongly, em-
ployment was lagging behind. Many policy observers argued that as the
economy demanded greater ﬂexibility to adjust to a more competitive busi-
ness environment, labor regulations were becoming ever more binding.
We have shown that Argentina’s regulations do not quite do what theyare intended to do. They reverse discriminate provision of protection to
those workers with greater human capital. Regulations appeared regres-
sive, limiting the opportunities of those worse oﬀ and protecting the jobs
of those endowed with higher human capital. We also found that, other
things being equal, those who do have regulatory coverage get lower in-
comes. That is, there is a trade-oﬀ between this fringe “beneﬁt” and earn-
ings. The cost, while relatively small, was still signiﬁcant.
Regulations, and in particular severance payments, represent a cost for
business. Firms rationally respond to them by lowering their demand for
labor. Indeed, both in the short run and (mostly) in the long run, there is
a strong negative eﬀect of regulations on the level of labor demand. This
downward shift of labor demand is at least partially responsible for the
drop in earnings that is found to be associated with regulatory coverage.
Similarly, any downward shift of a demand curve increases the potential
for employment reduction.
To compound the problem, our estimates indicate that when regulations
become stricter, ﬁrms rationally alter their labor allocations. They substi-
tute workers for hours. Indeed, we ﬁnd that individually worked hours go
up with an increased regulatory burden at the same time that the number
of workers is reduced. Regulations do not appear to be helpful in creating
employment.
Appendix A
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A
Fig. 6A.1 Labor regulations regulatory costs: A,severance payment; B, holiday leave
Source: IERAL database, based on legislation enforced in each period.B
Fig. 6A.1 (cont.) Labor regulations regulatory costs: A, severance payment; 
B, holiday leave
Source: IERAL database, based on legislation enforced in each period.
Fig. 6A.2 Evolution of the personal and employer contributions to social security
as percentage of gross wage
388 Guillermo Mondino and Silvia MontoyaAppendix B
Permanent Household Survey
The microdata data set available to track down the evolution of employment
is the Permanent Household Survey (PHS). The PHS survey is a random
sample of households that contains an array of personal, demographic, and
economic information on individual household members. They are con-
ducted twice a year (in May and October) since 1974 in the main urban cen-
ters of Argentina.36The ﬁles record information on each respondent’s labor
market status and living arrangements during the survey week as well as the
retrospective data on labor market activity during the previous month.
In terms of personal, demographic, and economic information on indi-
vidual household members, the following information is available: labor
market status (employed, unemployed, or nonlabor force), relation to
household head, age, sex, marital status, hours worked in the survey week,
occupation, ﬁrm size and sector of activity, nonlabor income, schooling,
number of children, hourly wage, and number of hours worked. Wage
earners declare fringe beneﬁts, making it possible to detect covered and un-
covered people. It is not diﬃcult to join personal and household ﬁles and
to create from these joined databases variables related to households than
can inﬂuence individual behavior toward the labor market.
The PHS has a rotating sample design, with households (addresses,
strictly speaking) in the survey for four waves (two years), with the sample
renewed for each wave.
Labor Market Regulations on Employment Decisions by Firms: Argentina 389
36. Considering the total sample is about 80 percent of Argentina’s urban population. It
must be remembered that about 15 percent of Argentina’s population lives in rural areas (de-

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































No. of observations 13,202 21,618
Source: IERAL database.
Note: Robust z-statistics in parentheses.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.Table 6B.3 Probit Model with Sample Selection: Women
Coeﬃcient Standard Error ZP   z
Employed
Primary –0.079102 0.0419559 –1.885 0.059
High school 0.0753084 0.0486756 1.547 0.122
College 0.4914512 0.0753675 6.521 0
Experience 0.0177675 0.0051296 3.464 0.001
Experience∗∗2– 0.0001513 0.0001033 –1.466 0.143
Children 0.0107576 0.0137898 0.78 0.435
Child  6– 0.035998 0.0240721 –1.495 0.135
Constant 1.063247 0.1024139 10.382 0
Probability of participation
Primary –0.1724532 0.0177661 –9.707 0
High school 0.1627323 0.0202538 8.035 0
College 0.9491935 0.0301072 31.527 0
Experience 0.059959 0.0017564 34.138 0
Experience∗∗2– 0.0014007 0.0000328 –42.723 0
Children –0.1488518 0.0050678 –29.372 0
Household Head 0.8155764 0.0198255 41.138 0
Nonlabor –0.0000649 0.0019907 –0.033 0.974
Constant –0.4423268 0.0261064 –16.943 0
/athrho –0.0956706 0.0812272 –1.178 0.239
Rho –0.0953798 0.0804883
Log likelihood –3.61e   07
Censored observations 34,291
Uncensored observations 24,235
Wald  2(7) 208.54
Prob    2 .0000
Source: IERAL database.Table 6B.4 Probit Model with Sample Selection: Males
Coeﬃcient Standard Error ZP   z
Employed
Primary 0.1316827 0.0291969 4.51 0
High school 0.3709243 0.0366284 10.127 0
College 0.6478144 0.0576389 11.239 0
Experience 0.0185666 0.0036929 5.028 0
Experience∗∗2– 0.0001938 0.0000677 –2.861 0.004
Children 0.0075412 0.0094311 0.8 0.424
Child  6 0.0625686 0.019189 3.261 0.001
Constant 0.9992917 0.0478594 20.88 0
Probability of participation
Primary –0.0951961 0.0286152 –3.327 0.001
High school 0.1236844 0.0349269 3.541 0
College 0.3313181 0.0650153 5.096 0
Experience 0.1497022 0.0028334 52.836 0
Experience∗∗2– 0.0030261 0.0000478 –63.361 0
Children 0.0727816 0.0098712 7.373 0
Household Head 0.717768 0.027059 26.526 0
Nonlabor –0.005561 0.0027943 –1.99 0.047
Constant –0.3758164 0.0383718 –9.794 0
/athrho –0.5661471 0.067164 –8.429 0
Rho –.5125241 .0495213 –0.6029607 –0.4090819
Log likelihood –2.26e 07
Number of observations 49,152
Censored observations 7,994
Uncensored observations 41,158
Wald  2(7) 273.54
Prob    2 0.0000
Source: IERAL database.
Appendix C
INDEC Industrial Survey: Methodology
The source of data for the preparation of the indexes of physical volume,
workers employed, hours worked, and wages per worker is the Monthly In-
dustrial Survey carried out by INDEC on a total of 1,271 industrial estab-
lishments. It is a countrywide sample selected from the third stage of the
1985 National Economic Census. The universe consists of establishments
employing more than ten workers and covers all of manufacturing. Com-
plementary data are also provided for public and private institutions.
The survey consists of two questionnaires (A and F), which are answered
by the same group of establishments. Questionnaire (A) registers data on
jobs, timetables, and wages, while (F) registers product information—phys-ical amounts produced with own and third-party raw materials and dis-
patches in physical and monetary units—with a speciﬁcally designed ques-
tionnaire per establishment. Both questionnaires are submitted monthly.
The bulk of the forms are collected by surveyors from INDEC or from the
Provincial Statistics Departments according to agreements with INDEC.
Once the survey forms are collected, they are subjected to routine edit-
ing and registry in the database; a team of analysts assesses their consis-
tency, missing items are allocated, and then indicators are calculated.
Since the Monthly Industrial Survey began to be taken in January 1990,
it was decided to publish the new series with the average of the 1990 indexes
as a basis for comparison and to call this year the base year for the sake of
simplicity.
Table 6C.1 Description of Variables Used in Manufacturing Survey Analysis (INDEC
Industrial Survey)
Variable Deﬁnition Name Measurement Issues
Employment and hours Employment Log of manufacturing employment index.
Employment_k “Linem” lagged k periods.
Hours per Worker Log of hours per worker index.
Hours per Worker_k “Linhe” lagged k periods.
Linhag Log of agency hours personnel index.
Wage and labor cost Normal Wage Log of normal wage index (without overtime 
hours).
Overtime Wage Log of overtime hours wage index.
Hourly Wage Log of hourly wage index.
Regulation Log of labor regulations index. The index is 
based on severance payment (sector average 
tenure   sector average lay-oﬀs) plus payroll 
taxes.
Product and production Output Log of production index.
Output_k “Linpf” lagged k periods.
Instrumental variables Linpbi Log of GDP index.
Unemployment  Log of aggregate unemployment index.
Aggregate Index
Lni_gram Log of economic openness index ([import  
export]/GDP) by sector.
Physical Capital Price  Log of physical capital price index.
Index
Consumer Price Index Log of consumer price index.
Wholesale Price Index Log of wholesale price index.
Dcb Dummy equal to 1 if output growth was less 
than 2.7% by quarter.
Dce Dummy equal to 1 if output growth was be-
tween 2.7% and 4% by quarter.
Dca Dummy equal to 1 if output growth was greater 
than 4% by quarter.
Source: IERAL database.
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Unbalanced Panel Balanced Panel
Linem Linhe Linem Linhe
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Linsat –0.173 –0.193 –0.121 –0.173
(21.79)∗∗∗ (36.54)∗∗∗ (13.51)∗∗∗ (26.51)∗∗∗
Prodh 0.119 0.129 0.064 0.136
(10.59)∗∗∗ (17.58)∗∗∗ (4.85)∗∗∗ (13.74)∗∗∗
Linpf_1 –0.043 –0.052 –0.030 –0.066
(6.86)∗∗∗ (12.26)∗∗∗ (3.67)∗∗∗ (10.39)∗∗∗
Linsae 0.018 0.054 0.026 0.053
(7.01)∗∗∗ (32.56)∗∗∗ (8.09)∗∗∗ (22.07)∗∗∗
Linem_1 0.815 –0.079 0.888 –0.093
(77.04)∗∗∗ (11.07)∗∗∗ (59.86)∗∗∗ (8.24)∗∗∗
Linem_2 –0.252 0.059 –0.297 0.080
(18.90)∗∗∗ (6.52)∗∗∗ (15.36)∗∗∗ (5.41)∗∗∗
Linem_3 0.307 –0.056 0.288 –0.038
(28.38)∗∗∗ (7.60)∗∗∗ (20.13)∗∗∗ (3.45)∗∗∗
Linhe_1 0.047 0.208 0.027 0.270
(3.65)∗∗∗ (23.56)∗∗∗ (1.57) (20.54)∗∗∗
Linhe_2 0.078 –0.013 0.007 0.017
(6.20)∗∗∗ (1.48) (0.44) (1.39)
Linhe_3 0.038 0.017 0.055 0.025
(3.18)∗∗∗ (2.02)∗∗ (3.68)∗∗∗ (2.18)∗∗
t2 –0.031 0.093 –0.036 0.092
(6.70)∗∗∗ (29.15)∗∗∗ (6.90)∗∗∗ (23.26)∗∗∗
t3 –0.032 0.087 –0.026 0.081
(6.53)∗∗∗ (26.06)∗∗∗ (4.83)∗∗∗ (19.67)∗∗∗
t4 –0.020 0.082 –0.013 0.071
(4.24)∗∗∗ (25.73)∗∗∗ (2.47)∗∗∗ (17.94)∗∗∗
Lnreg –0.010 0.021 –0.008 0.017
(1.40) (4.48)∗∗∗ (1.04) (2.83)∗∗∗
Constant 0.279 4.051 0.479 3.512
(2.81)∗∗∗ (56.12)∗∗∗ (4.06)∗∗∗ (37.12)∗∗∗
Adjusted R2 .90 .72 .87 .71
No. of observations 10,532
Source: IERAL database.
Notes: Instruments are product: linsat_1; linpf_2; linpf_3; linpf_4, lipc, lipk, lipm, lni_uag,
dce; dca; wages: linsat_1; linpf_2; linpf_3; linpf_4, lipc, lipk, lipm, lni_uag, dce; dca. See table
6A.5 for description of the variables. Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.In the sampling design, a stratiﬁed method of optimal allocation was
used, making the selection probability for any given establishment vary ac-
cording to branch of activity and strata.37 The indicators for diﬀerent ag-
gregation levels up to division and general levels are obtained from the
most disaggregated results, weighting them according to the percentage
share in year 1986 of the variable chosen for each indicator (see table 6C.3).
The percentage share of each division during 198638 in the aforemen-
tioned indicators is detailed in table 6C.4.
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37. The denomination of activity branch is applied to a subgroup of the third revision of
the CIIU, or a body of subgroups generally coinciding with the four-digit subgroups of the
third revision of the CIIU and, in a few cases, with the three-digit subgroups of the third re-
vision of the CIIU. The strata are two: (1) establishments with between 10 and 200 paid staﬀ,
and (2) establishments with more than 200 paid staﬀ.
38. This corresponds to the third stage of the 1985 Economic Census and refers to the uni-
verse of establishments with paid staﬀ.
Table 6C.3 Variables in the Industrial Survey
Index Weighting Factor
Physical production Volume value added
Workers employed Workers employed
Hours worked Hours worked
Wages per worker Total wages
Source: IREAL database.
Notes: Value added was calculated as the diﬀerence between the values of production and in-
termediate consumption, excluding value added tax (VAT). Workers, hours worked, and to-
tal wages correspond to paid staﬀ employed in production processes of categories no higher
than that of supervisor.
Table 6C.4 Base Year Weights
General Level: Value Workers Hours
Total and Subdivision Wages Added Employed Worked
3G e neral level for industry 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
31 Foodstuﬀs, beverages, and tobacco 22.76 24.03 24.60 21.26
32 Textiles and leather products 9.57 16.45 16.20 13.89
33 Wood, wooden products, and furniture 1.65 4.97 4.71 2.20
34 Paper, printers, and publishers 5.04 5.10 5.26 6.00
35 Chemicals and petroleum-based products 29.75 10.19 10.43 12.44
36 Cement, glass, ceramics, and other 
nonmetallic minerals 3.59 5.64 5.74 5.57
37 Basic metals industry 4.01 7.83 7.59 10.98
38 Metal products, machinery, and equipment 22.81 25.11 24.82 27.19
39 Other manufacturing industries 0.82 0.66 0.64 0.47
Source: IREAL database.The Index of Physical Volume of Production (IVF) provides, with quar-
terly frequency, an approximation to the development of value added at
constant prices. It is worth noting that this last measurement cannot be
carried out for each year concerned, let alone each quarter, since in order
to obtain it one would have to measure its components (production and in-
termediate consumption values) at current prices and measure the corre-
sponding deﬂators. This is why the IVF is usually considered to be the best
substitute.
However, it is necessary to add the caution that the relationship between
value added and production is not constant. As an illustration it may be
mentioned that, as from the census data, a drop in this relationship was no-
ticed during the 1986–1993 period. This was basically due to the economy’s
externalization process, which stemmed from the deep structural change
taking place from 1990.
Calculation Procedure
The main source of data is Form F of the Monthly Industrial Survey.
This contains data on the product basket for each establishment surveyed.
In each establishment, the index of physical volume is calculated
monthly, relating the value of its monthly production basket at 1986 ﬁgures
to the value of the same for that year. For establishment e this would give
IVF e       100,
in which sigma covers all products i selected for the establishment, and
p0   the 1986 price vector
qt
0  the vector of monthly amounts for 1986
qt   the amounts in month t
It should be mentioned that vectors p for prices and q for amounts cor-
respond to a product basket that represents at least 80 percent of the value
of production in each establishment.
In other words, the basic expression of the calculation corresponds to a
Laspeyres quantity index. When new products appear, they are incorpo-
rated into the calculation, assigning them a zero amount in 1986 and es-
tablishing a p0 emerging from the analysis of current prices based on simi-
lar products of other establishments—or, if this is not possible, respecting
the relative current price relationship for that year. Quarterly indexes are
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